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app:tlsfingerprint
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app:tlsfingerprint [2017/11/29 09:46] vivek |
app:tlsfingerprint [2018/03/04 07:57] (current) veera |
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| - | ~~Title: SJLJSADJA ~~ | + | ~~Title: TLS Fingerprinting using Trisul ~~ |
| ====== TLS Fingerprinter ====== | ====== TLS Fingerprinter ====== | ||
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| ===== What is TLS Fingerprinting ===== | ===== What is TLS Fingerprinting ===== | ||
| - | This technique builds upon the patterns found in the client preferences that are advertised in the "Client Hello" message that is sent as the very first message in the TLS Handshake process. This message is un-encrypted, therefore it allows for NSM tools like Trisul to look at it. Each SSL/TLS Client such as browsers use a particular version of a particular implementation of SSL/TLS. Some major implementations are OpenSSL, GnuTLS, Windows, Java SSE, NSS, embedded libraries like WolfSSL etc. | + | This technique builds upon the patterns found in the preferences that are advertised in the "Client Hello" message that is sent by the client as the very first message in the TLS Handshake process. This message is unencrypted, so it allows for NSM tools like Trisul to look at it. Every SSL/TLS Client uses a particular version of a particular implementation of SSL/TLS library. Some major implementations are OpenSSL, GnuTLS, Windows, Java SSE, NSS, WolfSSL etc. |
| The 3 major fields in the Client Hello that can identify a client are | The 3 major fields in the Client Hello that can identify a client are | ||
| Line 22: | Line 22: | ||
| So if you take all the three together there is a high likelyhood that you can minimize collisions and identify a particular client on a particular operating system.If you printed out the values of all these three fields and then computed a MD5 hash over the string, we can get a 'fingerprint'. We can call this a //JA3 hash// as proposed by the researchers John Althouse and team. | So if you take all the three together there is a high likelyhood that you can minimize collisions and identify a particular client on a particular operating system.If you printed out the values of all these three fields and then computed a MD5 hash over the string, we can get a 'fingerprint'. We can call this a //JA3 hash// as proposed by the researchers John Althouse and team. | ||
| - | At first, this approach may seem a bit flaky but it is not easy for an application to change its //print// dynamically without some major code rewrite. We currently have about 300 hashes largely due to Lee Brotherston's original work. We at Trisul also added in some 50 hashes. | + | At first, this approach may seem a bit flaky but it is not easy for an application to change its //print// dynamically without some major code rewrite. We currently have about 300 hashes largely due to Lee Brotherston's effort. We at Trisul also added in some 50-60 new prints. |
| - | Links | + | <note> |
| + | Further reading | ||
| * [[https://github.com/synackpse|Lee Brotherstons work]] on TLS Fingerprinting | * [[https://github.com/synackpse|Lee Brotherstons work]] on TLS Fingerprinting | ||
| + | * [[https://blog.squarelemon.com/tls-fingerprinting/|Square Lemon blog TLS Fingerprinting]] | ||
| * [[https://github.com/salesforce/ja3|JA3 Hash]] | * [[https://github.com/salesforce/ja3|JA3 Hash]] | ||
| + | </note> | ||
| ==== Fingerprints database ==== | ==== Fingerprints database ==== | ||
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| ==== Analysis of TLS Fingerprints ==== | ==== Analysis of TLS Fingerprints ==== | ||
| - | What are you going to do with these prints. There are a few options | + | There are two actionable things you can do with these prints |
| + | |||
| * **Malware prints** - These are hard to come by but if you can get a few prints from malware clients. You can flag them quickly. These will likely evade IDS because they use TLS to connect to presumably well known C&C servers with valid certificates etc. | * **Malware prints** - These are hard to come by but if you can get a few prints from malware clients. You can flag them quickly. These will likely evade IDS because they use TLS to connect to presumably well known C&C servers with valid certificates etc. | ||
| * **Anomaly detection** : If you can track known prints,then you can build a large Database over a period of time. After that you can send unseen prints into a "Triage state" where a human can look into it. | * **Anomaly detection** : If you can track known prints,then you can build a large Database over a period of time. After that you can send unseen prints into a "Triage state" where a human can look into it. | ||
| - | |||
| - | In both analysis paths,we think TLS Prints is a valuable piece of intel, especially given we are moving to pervasive TLS. | ||
| - | |||
| - | Lets look at what you can do with TrisulNSM and the new TLS Prints App. | ||
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| ===== Programatically resolving TLS Prints ===== | ===== Programatically resolving TLS Prints ===== | ||
| - | This App dumps all fingerprints along with the parameters used to compute them and the TCP Flow details in a log file. In another article we will outline how we can programatically deduce the Client Fingerprint. | + | This App dumps all fingerprints along with the parameters used to compute them into a log file. This allows us to programatically resolve unknown fingerprints. We released a TRP Ruby script to [[app:auto_fingerprint|programatically resolve TLS Prints using Web Server Access Logs]]. |
app/tlsfingerprint.1511948774.txt.gz · Last modified: 2017/11/29 09:46 by vivek
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